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ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION ELECTS
OFFICERS.
The College Athletic Association, Dec.
'6th, elected the following officers:
President-Fleitz, (Law.)
Vice President-Betz.
Secretary-Salter.
Treasurer -Thompson.
Foot Ball Manager-R. E. Smith.
Assistant-Brunyate.
Basket Ball Manager- McKinney.
Manager Prep. Foot Ball-Goodwin.
This is thefirst time in the history of the
College Athletic Association, that a law
man has been elected to its presidency.
Heretofore this office has been held by a
college man, law men under the constitution of the association being ineligible
for the office. The students in the Law
School objected to the disqualifying clause,
and refused to participate in the affairs of
the Association until it was removed. Realizing the justice of the law students' demands, and desiring to harmonize the two
departments-College and Law-the Association amended the constitution to the
satisfaction of the law men, and under the

amended constitution placed in nomination for the presidency Fleitz and Carlin.
The new president of the Association is
a resident of WelIsboro. He wasgraduated
from the Mansfield Normal School in 1900.
Since entering the Law School, he has
taken an active interest in athletics and
has been prominent in all affairs in which
the Law School waa interested. He is a
member of the Middle class, and was president of his class last year.
SCHOOL NOTES.
Two years ago, the Athletic Association
requested the students of the Law School
to subscribe to the Association in the same
manner that the students of the College
subscribed; i. e. by subscribing $4.00 a year
for the privilege of attending all athletic
events conducted under theauspices of the
Association, and permitting this subscription to be collected with their tuition. The
Law students, in mass meeting, refused to
subscribe unless the constitution of the
Athletic Association by which law men
were ineligible for either the Presidency
of the Athletic Association or the manage-
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ment of any of the teams, was so amended
that law men would be eligible for these
offices. A committee of law men was appointed to obtain the abrogation of the objectional clause in the constitution. The
efforts of the committee were successful, for
soon afterwards, the Athletic Association
amended its constitution, granting to the
law students the same rights and privileges that the college menenjoyed. Again
the Athletic Association requested the law
students to subscribe, again the law students refused. No reason for the last refusal was given.
Now the Athletic Association has gone
a step further. It has given to a law man
the highest office at its disposal, its presidency, thereby removing any valid objection that the law students could have to
subscribing.
This action on the part of the Association has been performed in good faith, and
in compliance with the agreement, made
with the law men two years ago. They
have performed their part of the agreement. Why don't the law men perform
theirs?
The Law school is well represented this
year on the College Glee and Mandolin
club. Bishop is leader of the Glee Club,
and the following are members of the
Mandolin club: Hillyer, Benjamin, Oldt,
Hubler and Gillespie.
The Senior class had decided to hold a
banquet some time during the Spring term.
A committee has been appointed to make
the necessary arrangements.
The librarian complains that the rule
with reference to the replacing of books,
after using them, is being constantly and
flagrantly violated.
Unless the violation of the rule is discontinued, he
threatens to use the power that ie possesses
to stop it.
Core, Fleitz and Heller attended the
army and navy foot ball game in Philadelphia, Nov. 29th.
Fred Gerber, who was elected historian
of the Senior class at the annual election
of officers, has resigned, and Harry Fox
has been elected to succeed him.

Hon. Fred Ikeler of Bloomsburg, one of
the lecturers at the annual Institute of the
teachers of Cumberland County, was a
guest of Watson of the Senior class, during
the time that he was in Carlisle.
Spencer entertained his brother, a student at Mercersburg Academy, during the
early part of this month.
Gross of theSenior class wascalled home
this month by the death of his grandmother. He was absent for several days.
In the recent examination for admission
to the bar in Luzerene County seven persons took the examination.
Only two
passed.

COMMONWEALTH vs. KAUFMAN.
During thefore part of this month, in the
court of Oyer and Terminer of Dickinson
Literary Society, Samuel Kaufman was
held for the murderof Daniel Sutto, of Mt.
Holly. It was alleged by the Commonwealth that Kaufman shot Sutto on the
night of the 22nd of Feby, 1902, while the
latter was sitting at atable in a front room
in his house. The Commonwealth had-no
direct evidence to commit Kaufman with
the crime, but hoped to convict him by circumstantial evidence. A strong chain of
circumstances connected him with the
crime, but when he took the witness stand
he considerably weakened the case of the
Commonwealth. His evidence was clear
and straight-forward, and made a favorable
impression on thejury, who acquitted him
after having been out three minutes.
Gerber of the Senior class presided as
judge. Gross and Chapman appeared for
the Commonwealth,and Diveley and Claycomb for the defendant.
An amusing feature of the trial was the
evidence of Yeagley and Hickernell, both
of whom testified in German. Henicke
acted as Interpreter.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Among the alumni who visited Carlisle
during the past month, were Mays and
Adamson of the class of '01. The former
is associated with Russell, '99, in Cameron,
W. Va., where they are practicing. Mays
is studying in a law office in Reading, the
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rules of Berks county requiring at least
one year's apprenticeship in a law office
before a student can take his examination
for admission to the bar.
John W. Kephart, class of '94, is forging
to the front rank of the Cambria County
Bar. During the past year he has attended
to important business for the Penna. R. R.
Co.

Chas. C. Greer, class of '95, in addition
to taking care of a lucrative practice, has
been elected to succeed himself as City
Solicitor of Johnstown.
Bruce H. Campbell, '96, of Johnstown,
Ila., where he has established a large practice has been elected president of the
Bruce H. Campbell Brickworks, located
at that place.

Frank and Joseph Rhodes have located
in Parkersburg, W. Va. They have organized a law firm under the name of Rhodes
& Rhodes.

MOOT COURT.
COIMONWEALTH vs. HOLLER.
Murder-Mediatecause of death- Whether
death was caused by prisoner or physician-Negligenceof physician.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The defendant is charged and indicted
for the murder of one Wilcox, upon the following facts:
The prisoner having a grudge against
the deceased, and in order to avenge a
fancied wrong placed arsenic in his coffee,
which Wilcox drank and became violently
sick. One Dr. Harbottle was called in to
attend the sick man, and being intoxicated
gave the said Wilcox a wrong medicine or
antidote. It is admitted that Wilcox could
not have been saved; that he would have
lingered 12 to 15 hours, whereas he did die
about 8 hours after taking the poisoned
coffee. It is further admitted that Dr.
Harbottle in his treatment of the case was
grossly and criminally negligent.
MOREHOUSE and LLOYD for commonealth.

One who has wilfully caused death of
another, although improper treatment of
surgeon may hasten death, is guilty of
murder or manslaughter. Commonwealth
v. Hackett, 2 Allen 136; Commonwealth
v. M. Pike, 3 Cush. 181. Prisoner cannot
escape by showing death was result of an
accident during the operation. 45 L. R.
A. 784; Commonwealth v. Eisenhower,
181 Pa. 470.
LOURImER and OLDT for defendant.
Mfalice not being shown there can be no
conviction in the first degree. Com. v.
Cleary. 135 Pa. 70; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa.
9; Coin. v. Johnson, 24 Pa. 386.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Gentlemen of the jury: The defendant
in this case is charged with the murder of
one Wilcox. The defendant is accused of
placing arsenic in the coffee of the deceased, in order to avenge a fancied wrong.
The deceased drank this coffee and became violently sick, and a physician was
called in. The physician was intoxicated
and gave Wilcox a wrong antidote which,
it is alleged, shortened the life of the said
Wilcox from four to six hours. It is admitted that Wilcox could not have been
saved undet any circumstances.
Gentlemen of the jury: The defendant
contends that if the condition of the said
Wilcox offered or afforded an opportunity
for another party to kill, the defendant
would not be guilty, even though he had
inflicted a mortal wound. We have been
asked to charge you to this effect, but we
take this opportunity, gentlemen, to instruct you that this is not correct. In
Commonwealth v. Eisenhower, 181 Pa.
470, the defendant was indicted for murder,
and it appeared that the deceased was
killed by a pistol shot, fired by the prisoner.
There was evidence that a drainage tube,
inserted by the surgeons to relieve their
patient, had found its way into the spinal
canal, and it was alleged that this caused
the death. The court in its charge said,
"But suppose it did, the prisoner cannot
escape by showing that death was the
result of an accident occurring in an
operation, which his felonious act made
necessary."
Gentlemen of the jury: The case we are
interested in at present is very similar to
the case just mentioned. The fact that
the physician was intoxicated, you have
nothing to do with, for it. is admitted,
without doubt, that the deceased would
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fore to produce this death at a time when
it would not have occurred, but for the act
in question.
There are probably no. single causes.
Etects are produced by the co-operation
of two or more forces. Water freezes, not
simply because of the reduction of temperature below *32, but also because of the
intrinsic nature of the water, etc. Water
will freeze at 032, while mercury will not.
A can be said to kill B, though the blow
would not have killed C, nor even B, had
B been in some other state of health than
that in which he was. The contribution
of organic or other defects of body to the
death, does not make it the less, a result
of the blow; or the blow the cause of the
Encyc. 93.
death. 21 Am. and Eg.
If neither of the causes alone, would
produce death, but both together have,
each is a cause, and the agent who-applied
either, may be said to have killed the
animate thing, man or not. Bishop, Crim.
Law, p. 359.
It does not appear whether the "antidote" would, alone, have caused death.
What does appear is, that the arsenic
would have caused death in 15 hours after
its administration, and that, in consequence of the "antidote," death came in 8
hours. Death, at that time, may have been
due to the co-operation of the two poisons,
or it may have been due to the second
poison alone; i. e. the second poison alone
would, so far as appears, have wrought
JONES, J.
death at the time at which death occurred.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
If this supposition is correct, the arsenic
Murder occurs, at common law, says cannot be a cause of the death. If forces
a and. b will produce a given event at time
Blackstone, "when a person of sound
1, and forces a and c will produce the event
memory and discretion unlawfully killeth
any reasonable creature in being, and but at a later time, m, and forces a, b, and c
under the king's peace, with malice afore- are found to be working, but the result octhought, either express or implied." 4 curs at time 1, it is impossible to say that
Comm. 195. The 74th section of the act of force c was a cause'of that result.
Were there any adequate evidence on
March 31st, 1860, 1 P & L. 1274, declares
"all murder which shall be perpetrated
which the jury might find that Wilcox's
by means of poison" to be murder in the death would not have occurred, either at
all, or as soon as it did, but for -the cofirst degree.
There is no murder, and therefore no operation of the arsenic, it might properly
murder in the first degree, unless there is be allowed to return a verdict of guilty.
a killing. To kill is to cause to die, "to 21 Am. and Eng. Eneyc. 93. There is no
deprive of life, animal or vegetable; put an such evidence. The arsenic would have
end to the animate existence of, put to killed in 15 hours. But suppose at the
death as a human being; slay." Standard expiration of the 8th hour, X having no
Dictionary ad verb. All men will die relation to Holler, had shot and instantly
without human agency. To kill is there- killed Wilcox. Would Holler have done

have died in atleastsix hours, in any case,
and the skillfulness of the medical attendance does not concern you.
This is held in the case of Com. v. Green,
1 Ashmead 289, where, "a young man in
vigorous health wasshot down bya musket
ball. He falls to the ground aiid is conveyed to a bed from which he never rises,
and after receiving the most skillful
surgical treatment, from a medical attendant of the first professional standing,
dies in eight days." The Court, per King
P. J., says: "It is not, however, requisite,
that the wound should have been the
immediate cause of death, to render the
defendant responsible for its consequences;
it is sufficient, if it be the mediate cause.
Even when the wound is not mortal in
itself, but for want of proper applications
or from neglect, turns to a fever, is the
immediate cause of death of the party
wounded, the party by whom the wound is
given, is guilty of murder or manslaughter,
according to the circumstances."3
The Act of March 31, 1860, states that
"all murder perpetrated by means of
poison, etc., shall be murder of the first
degree." Therefore, gentlemen of the
jury: According to the facts of this case,
we feel justified in saying, that if you find
the facts as alleged, to be true, then it is
your duty to bring in a verdict of murder
of the first degree, and if you do not find
the facts as alleged, to be true, then it is
your duty to acquit the defendant.
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the killing? Surely not, unless the arsenic,
then in Wilcox's body, imparted to the
bullet wound, the power to kill at the time.
There ought to be some evidence that it
did impart this power. We know not
what the "antidote" was. Wasitavirulent
poison? Would it have probably killed
one not under the influence of arsenic, as
quickly as one who was? No light is cast
on these important matters. When either
of two hypotheses is equally supported by
the evidence, one requiring an acquittal,
it is error to allow a conviction. It is
possible that the "antidote" would not
have killed, when it did, but for the
arsenic. It is also possible that it would.
The jury must not be allowed to speculate
whether it would or not.
But, though we are not warranted in inferring that the arsenic co-operated with
the "antidote" and caused the death in
eight hours after its administration, may
we regard the administration of the arsenic
as the cause of the administration of tle
"antidote," so as to be justified in holding
Holler as the ultimate cause of the effect
of the "antidote"? We think we may.
The taking of the "arsenic" made the
resort to an antidote necessary, in order to
avoid death. No want of care in the
selection of Dr. Harbottle is shown. He
may have been the only physician accessible. His drunkenness may not have
been known. That he was in fact drunk,
and, in consequence, made a. mistake in
the selection of the "antidote," will not so
disconnect Holler's act with the result of
that mistake, as to negative its being the
ultimate cause of that result. Wilcox's
own want of care; his refusal to submit to
treatment; the unskillfulness of the treatment submitted to, would not cut the
causal bond connecting the death with the
exhibition of the arsenic. 21 Am. and
Eng. Encyc. 95, Bishop, Crim. Law p. 360.
In Commonwealth v. Eisenhower, 181
Pa. 470, the victim of the defendant was
shot in the spinal column. Thephysician
was obliged to employ a drainage tube
which, it was contended, accidentally
found its way into the spinal canal and
caused the death. The court remarked
that "the prisoner cannot escape by showing that death was the result of the accident occurring in an operation, which his
felonious act made necessary." King J,
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in Commonwealth v. Green, 1 Ash. 289,
held that it was a killing to inflict a nonmortal gunshot wound, which "for want
of proper applications, or from neglect,
turns to a gangrene or fever," which is
"For,
the immediate cause of death.
though the fever or gangrene and not the
wound, be the immediate cause of the
death, yet the wound, being the cause of
the gangrene or fever, is the mediate
cause of the death."
Holler can be properly said to have killed
Wilcox when he administered arsenic
to him, in consequence of which Wilcox
applied to a physician for an "antidote,"
received from him what was supposed to
be such, took it, and died.
Judgment affirmed.

COMMONWEAIT'H OF PENNA. vs.
PLUMILY.
Constitution of U. S.-rolice power of
state-Inter-state commerce. Statute
forbiddingsale of cigarettes.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A statute is passed by the Pennsylvania
Assembly, forbidding all sales of cigarettes
within the state. The defendant imports
into the state from Maryland, a number
of paper packages of cigarettes, each package containing ten cigarettes. These packages were transported in an open basket.
It was shown on trial of defendant that it
was customary for shippers to use such
baskets, and sometimes to use closed boxes.
Defendant is convicted under the statute
for having sold several of the packages of
cigarettes. The statuteis sustained by the
Supreme Court of the state, and defendant
takes an appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States, alleging error.
Fox and GILLESPIE for the commonwealth.
Every state has right under its police
power to prohibit the importation and sale
of all articles unfit for the use of its people.
Austin v. Tenn., 50 L. R. A. 478.
AtERmAN and KRFSs for the defendant.
Congress shall have power to regulate
commerce, among the several states. Art.
I, Sec. 8, Constitution of U.S. The power
to regulate commerce is exclusively in
congress. 20 Phila. Rep. 187. Cigarettes
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The importer may desire to sell in the
bulks in which he imports, or in portions
of these bulks. If he sells in-the original
bulks, and they are taxed, the sale of them
is hampered. But, if he sells in parcels,
OPINION OF THE COURT.
and the parcels, as soon as produced by
A case similar in all respects to the
the sub-division, are taxed, the sale of them.
present, was decided by the Supreme
is equally hampered. If the principle is
Court of the United States, in 1898. See
adopted that the original packages have
Tennessee v. Austin.
For the reasons
immunity from taxation only so long as
given in the opinion of the majority of the they remain unbroken, thefi it is only one
court in that case, we must affirm the
kind of commerce that is immune from
judgment of the Supreme Court in the
state regulation and repression, viz.: that
present case.
of importers who sell at wholesale. That
The doctrine of the original package, as
of importers who sell at retail is unguarded,
established in Brown v. Maryland, was
and the principle of the decision of Ward
not intended to afford dishonest traders
v. Maryland is abandoned. Surely, the
an avenue of escape from payment of
coustitution does not distinguish between
taxes on their property, and a shield under
importations for retail sale, and those for
which to violate the law.
wholesale sale. It could no more have been
It was not intendea thereby to take intended by the constitution-makers that
away the police powers of the states, over
the state should tax or otherwise regulate
the health and protection of its citizens.
or restrain the former, than the latter.
If the arbitrary rule contended for by the
What a surprise is it therefore, to find,
appellant and upheld by the minority of
in May v. New Orleans, 178 U. S. 496,
the Supreme Court in Austin v. Tennesthat if the importers disrupt the original
see, is to be made the law, then it may
bulks into smaller parcels, these parcels
very reasonably be asked, what is to prebecome subject to state tax, that is, his
vent the total abrogation by the unscrupucapacity to sell them, the only object of
lous merchant, of the food laws of thestate,
the importation, may be diminished. So
and the laws regulating the sale of liquors,
it seems, after all, that it is only the
and other similar deleterious articles?
foreign or inter-state commerce which conWhatever theoretical objection might
templates sale in the very bulks imported,
be raised to the original package test, we
that is immune from state regulation.
are nevertheless bound to regard it as the
The retailing importer is at the mercy of
settled rule for the determination of cases
the states. Only the wholesaling importer
of the kind of Brown v. Maryland. It
owns one master, that is congress.
would be a dangerous and unwarranted
But, Ward v. Maryland seems to coninvasion of the powers of the states, to
cede that, even though the wholesaling
apply that rule to the present case.
importer is free from state tax on his
The judgment of the Supreme Court of
business of importation, and on the bulks
Penna. is affirmed.
imported, just as soon as he sells one of
DRUmHELLER, J.
these bulks, it becomes subject to state tax,
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
and the sale of it to state regulation. It is
In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419,
quite clear, that if goods are imported, in
a tax was laid by the state on the business
order to be sold, they are imported in big
of importation. The Supreme Court held
bulks in order to be sold in little bulks.
the act unconstitutional, because (a) it
If the package can never be broken,
was a tax on imports, and (b) it regulated
without exposing the whole to tax, even
commerce with foreign nations. The arguin the hands of the importer, commerce is
ment was, to tax the business of importing
impeded. And if the importer cannot
is to tax the goods imported. To tax them
sell even in bulk, without the bulk, though
is to increase their price; to decrease the yet unbroken, being, in the hands of the
facility with which they ban be sold. To
first buyer, liable to state taxation and
decrease that facility is to diminish imregulation, the impediment to commerce
portation.
is precisely the same as if the tax had
are. articles of commerce. 125 U. S. 500.
Silence of congress as to cigarettes, is
equivalent to its declaration that they are
a commenrcial commodity. 102 U. S. 691;
120 U. S. 492; 135 U. S. 100.
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been laid on the bulk In the hands of the
importer. Adapted, the logic of Ward v.
Maryland would run thus: Importation
occurs, for the sake of sale by the importer;
but sale in bulk by him occurs for the
sake of sale by the buyer. To tax the
bulk in the buyers' hands, is to increase
the ultimate price of the article, and so
lessen the retail buying. This will lessen
the wholesale buying, and this will lessen
the importation. Hence, it is not permissible to a state to tax the thing in
bulk even in the hands of the first purchaser, from the importer. Yet for some
reason, it has been held that the goods
even in the original bulk, can be taxed by
the state in the hands of the first purchaser.
Following in the lead of Ward v. Maryland, came the cases in which the states
prohibited sales of certain kinds of articles,
liquors, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100;
oleomargarine, Schollenberger v. Penna,
171 U. S. 1. Still infested with the notion
that a state prohibition of sale would
interfere with inter-state commerce, if it
prohibited the sale by the importer, in the
original bulk, but would not interfere
with that commerce, if it prohibited the
sale by the importer, after he separated
this bulk, or if it prohibited a sale by the
purchaser from the importer of the original
bulk, a notion -which it would not be too
severe to characterize as puerile, the courts
were at length driven to bay by the
practical sense of business men. What,
thought they, is to hinder our making
the original packages as large or as small
as we choose? so large that they must be
broken before the retailer can sell or the
consumer buy them, or so small that the
retailer and consumer will require no subdivision of them? If it be indeed a constitutional right of the importer to make
one sale, within the state, of the original
bulk, without hindrance from the state,
in order to preserve unshackeled by the
states, inter-state commerce; surely, the
constitution does not require us to iriport
in bulks of such shape and size as to deprive us of the protection of this principle.
h Schollenberger v. Penna., 171 U. S. 1,
the oleomargarine was brought into this
state in packages of 10 lbs., suitable for
retail sale; and was sold to consumers. The
Supreme Court adhered to its doctrine,
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that the importer had a right to make one
sale, despite the minatory legislation of
Pennsylvania.
Then came Austin v. Tennessee, 179
U. S. 843. in which 10 cigarettes put up
in paper packages 3 inches in length and
1 inches in width, were introduced into
and sold in Tennessee, by a manufacturer
of another state. The Supreme Court now
retreated from its original position, that
the first sale in the bulk in which a
commodity was brought into a state was
immune from state prohibition; and took
up the very different position, that the
first sale in the bulk in which the commodity was brought into a state, was thus
immune, provided that bulk was so large
that it could not be sold at retail until
broken. This, we think, is the import of
the criterion. The consequence is that
liquor, tobacco, being articles of commerce
for drinking and smoking, the intro,duction and sale of them in the state cannot be prohibited, but they must never be
put into such form that they will be buyable by the consumer. They must be
brought into the state and sold In considerable bulks. The state can prohibit
the sale of them, as soon as these bulks
are divided into parcels so small as tq be
buyable by the consumer.
I And now, what has became of the great
principle of Ward v. Maryland? The
power to Import is the power to sell. The
state cannot lessen by tax, much less
wholly destroy by penalizing law, the
power to sell, because in so doing, it taxes
importation, or it regulates inter-state
commerce. We at length discover that
the state may prohibit all sales, even of
goods brought into it from other states,
unless they are of such bulks that they
cannot be bought and consumed by consumers, that is, states can, in a most
important degree, regulate inter-state
commerce, provided the reasons of the
regulation is the preservation of the health
and morals of the citizens of the state.
They can make a first sale in the state
worthless, by preventing a second sale,
and by requiring the first sale to be in
such bulk that nobody would buy if such
second sale were impossible. Thus has the
principle of Ward v. Maryland in its
most numerous and important applications
been reduced to nullity, when the object
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of the state is to conserve the health or
morals of its people. When the object is
not so laudable we have also seen that the
state can in a most important way regulate
commerce between it and other states or
foreign nations, by taxing the things imported, as soon as they pass from the importer, even in the original bulk, or as
soon as he subdivides the imported bulk
with a view to sale. That is, the state
can embarrass importation by impeding
the importers' power to sell the thing imported.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHN PARSONS vs. SAM'L GREEN.
Landlord and tenant-Optionof tenant to
continue in possession after regular
term-Bights of lessor and lessee under
such lease.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
This is an action of ejectment. Parson
leased a house to Green for two years at
rental of $200 yearly. The lease provided
that Green could continue the lease for
one year at a time on giving notice, in
writing, to Parson of his intention three
months before the expiration of the term
of every added year, but that only three
(3) annual extensions should be allowed.
Green gave notice on December 31, 1900,
that he would hold over for two (2) years.
On Feb. 1, 1901, Parson notified him to
surrender the possession at the end of the
lease year. Green not doing so, this proceeding was begun to eject him.
BENJAMIN and WIlsoN for plaintiff.
An acceptance to be binding must be
identical with the terms of the offer, neither
falling within or going beyond these terms.
Clark on Contracts, p. 36; Claymaker v.
Irwin, 4 Wharton, 369; Allen et. al. v.
Irwin et. al. 159 Pa. 612; Vincent v. Woodland Oil Co., 165 Pa. 402; M. St. L. Ry. v.
Columbus Rolling Mill, 119 U. S. 149.
JAmES and LouRIMER for the defendant.
The action of ejectment is prematurely
brought. 11 Pa. 472; 17 U. N. C. 477; 54
Pa. 86..
Act of 1872 requires three months' notice
to the tenant before proceedings to eject
can be begun. Act of '63 requires three
months' notice to be given the tenant before the nd of the term. There was not a
compliance with either act in this case.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question confronting us in this case
is whether or not the tenant has violated
the terms of his lease.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff contend that this is a case of offer and acceptance; that Green's notice not being within
the terms of the offer, is invalid; therefore
he cannot resist ejectment. In support of
their contention they cite, Parson on Contracts; Claymaker v. Irwin, 4 Wharton
369; Allen v. Karwin, 159 Pa. 612; Vincent v. The Oil Co., 165 Pa. 402.
This view of the case, however, we cannot take. This is not a case of offer and
Cases under that head are
acceptance.
cases leading up to contracts-cases where
the contracts are not yet formed, where
there is no meeting of minds. But in the
case at bar we have no such contract. The
contract here has already been formed and
requires no further act of the parties to
complete its formation. The lease is the
original contract, and the question for the
court to determine is whether there has
been a compliance with the terms of that
instrument. McLleland v. Rush, 150 Pa.
60; Carrn v. Llewellyn, 5 Superior 60.
The case of McLleland v. Rush, supra,
is in some respects similar to the case under
consideration. In that case the landlord
let his premises for a term pf 5 years with
the option, in the tenant, to continue for 5
years additional after giving notice. For
insufficiency of notice, the tenant was
Discussing the rights of lessor,
ejected.
and lessee under the lease, Green J., said,
"No new contract was necessary to create
a new term, or to define its terms or conditions. The lessors were bound to accept
the enlarged tenancy upon the same terms
already provided by the existing lease."
Now, what were the terms of the lease
in the case at bar? Briefly, they provide
that if the tenant desires he may remain
on the premises for one, two or three additional years, upon giving notice. The tenant gave notice to remain for two years,
the landlord insists that this is such a
breach of the terms of the lease as to invalidate it. We do not think so. The tenant
had the option to remain one, two or three
years. Exercising it now to remain two
years, it cannot be said that he violates the
terms of the lease. If he had not given
the required notice, of course, he could not
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remain, but having given the notice as required, he has substantially complied with
the terms of the lease, and cannot be
ejected. The conditions as to the number
of years were made for his benefit and
could be waived by him, a right which he
has seen fit to exercise. To hold otberwise
would be to hold that Green had violated
the terms of his lease, a holding that would
not be warranted by the facts as stated.
Since the lease was made for benefit of
the tenant, since he has substantially complied with the conditions, and since there
is no violation of the terms thereof, we are
of the opinion that judgment should be
entered for defendant.
Judgment for defendant.
. WALSH,

J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The lease was unconditionally for two
years, ending on Afarch 31, 1891; and for
one year longer, on giving three months'
notice to Parsons of Green's intention to
remain. Should the second year be thus
elected by Green, he had a conditional
right to continue in possession a third
year, on giving three months' notice; and.
in the same way, he could continue in possession a fourth year.
The right of three extensions, by giving
notice, was il the lessee. It would be his
failure to give notice, only, that would deprive him of any portion of it.
The object of the notice was to inform
the lessor whether the lessee intended to
insist on his right of extension, and to
make him liable as tenant, on giving the
notice, for the extended term. We think
we may assume that the period of three
years was broken up into three sub-periods
for the convenience of the tenant. He
might wish to remain the first year, but
not the second, third and fourth years ; or,
having remained the first and second
years, he might wish to remain the third
year, but not the fourth year. Or, he
might be willing to bind himself to remain
the second or thethird year, and unwilling
to bind himself for three or two years at a
time. The option was wholly with the
tenant. The only question is, whether,
having in one election elected, and in one
notice notified the tenant of his election,
to remain two years, he has lost the right
to remain these two years.
It is true, that parties may make what
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contracts they choose, and they may condition their rights thereunder as they will.
These parties might have required that
each election should be for but one year,
and that each notice should be a notice of
this one year's election. The question is
simply, whether they have done so. We
think the learned court below right in
holding that the parties intended to give
the lessee the right to remain as long as
four years on the premises, but also to give
him the right to remain but one year, or
two years, or lhree years. The object of
the notice ulust have been to apprise the
landlord of the lessee's intention, in advance of the additional years, and to give
him a right to hold the lhssee liable for
one or more of these years, upon receiving
the notice.
The notice that the lessee would remain
two years was an intimation to the lessor
of his intention, and made it obligatory
,for the lessee to remain on the premises,
or rather, to perform the duties of a lessee
for that period.
When rights of dispossession are conferred by law, upon giving notices, and
not by contract, a certain strictness of form
of notice is insisted on, but when the parties have contracted with regard to notice
and dependent rights, their intention,
fairly inferrible from their words, the
habits of business men, and the nature of
the subject-matter, must prevail. Since
the remaining for two years longer was
wholly at the option of the lessee, on giving notice; and since, so far as can appear,
a notice three months before the second
year began and fifteen months before the
third year began, of the intention to remain those two years, was more useful to
the landlord than two notices, a year apart,
we think the decision below right. The
opposite view would be more academically
exact, perhaps, but we cannot accept it as
the norm of decision.
It may be well to call attention to the
fact that Parsons recognized the right of
Green to remain a second year, although
the notice given was of an intention to remain two years. By not objecting to the
continuance for the second year, after a
notice which did not conform to the letter
of the contract, we think Parsons would
preclude himself from surprising Green
with a notice of two months, that he must
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surrender the possession. If he did not
regard the notice as valid for two years,
he should not have beguiled Green into
thinking that he did.
Judgment affirmed.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA vs. JOHN
CUMMINGS.
Constitutionof U. S.-Interstatecommerce
-Ordinance of city couhcil taxing cabs
-Act of April 5, 1850, P. L. 469.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Philadelphia, by ordinance, imposed an
annual tax of $2.00 on all cabs employed
in the carriage of persons to and from
the Railroad Station. Cummings owned
twenty-five of such cabs, using them in
driving persons to and from the Penna.
Railroad Station. Refusing to pay the tax,
suit was brought and judgment for $40.00
recovered. Appeal to the Common Pleas.
Cummings contended that he was not
bound to pay the tax, because the ordinance did not distinguish between the carriage of persons intending to be transferred
by the Railroad out of the state, and that
of persons intending to be carried to other
points within the state. He alleged that
it interfered with interstate commerce.
DEvERs and BOUGHTON for appellant.
The word commerce is not limited to
traffic. Gibbon v. Ogden, 9 Whealer 1;
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Henderson v. N. Y. 92 U. S. 259. Congress cannot legislate for the regulation of comhierce on a navigable stream or a highway
exclusively within the limits of a State.
It is otherwise, however, where the stream
or highway connects with.another stream
or highway over which vessels or vehicles
of commerce are run. Whethers v. Buckley, 20 Howard, 84. Tnterstate commerce
cannot be taxed. Brennan v. Titusville,
153 U. S. 289.
GERBER and LONGBOTTOM for appellee.
This tax is constitutional. Washington
Borough v. McGeorge, 146 Pa. 248; Oil
City v. Oil City Trust Co., 11 Pa. C. Co.
350; Johnson v. Phila., 60 Pa. 445.
This license in no way interferes with
interstate commerce. Everything that
effects commerce is not a regulation of it
within meaning of U. S. constitution, Wabash R. R. Co. v. Ill., 118 U. S. 566.
Other cases cited were: Murren v. Ill.,
94 U. S. 113; Pick v. Chicago R. R., 94 U.

S. 164, 177; New Hope Boro. v. Tel. Co. 16
Sup. 306.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This case brings us to a consideration of
the Act of Assembly passed April 15, 1850,
(Pamph. L. 469) which provides that the
select and common council of the city of
Philadelphia shall have authority by ordinance or ordinances to provide for the
regulation.of omnibuses or vehicles in the
nature thereof; and to this end it shall be
lawful for the said councils, etc., to provide for the issuing of license to such and
so many persons as may apply to keep and
use such omnibuses or vehicles in the nature thereof, and to charge a reasonable
annual or other sum therefor. The validity of this act has been in dispute in two
separate and distinct suits and has twice
been before the Supreme Court, when the
act was upheld.
Frankford Passenger
Railway v. Phila.; 58 Pa. 119; and Johnson
v. Phila., 60 Pa. 415. The act mentions
omnibuses or vehicles in the nature thereof. In Frankford Pass. Ry. v. Phila.,
supra,the court, per Judge Strong, shows
that these words may be so extended as to
include the modern street car, and declares
a license tax of $50.00 per car valid. The
words "or vehicles in the nature thereof"
include those means of conveyance which
do not accommodate so many passengers
as the old-fashioned omnibus. The chief
function of an omnibus is to transfer
passengers. The function of a cab is the
same, and the fact that the cab only accommodates from two to four persons
while the omnibus accommodates twenty
or more, does not exclude the cab from the
power of the statute.
There is no question of reasonableness
raised in the argument, but that the tax
is reasonable, is a fact too obvious to admit
of discussion.
The only real question raised in this case
is that brought out by the plaintiff in error
in his defence based on interference with
interstate commerce. He alleges that he
is not bound to pay the tax, because the
ordinance did not distinguish between the
carriage of persons intending to be transported out of the state, and that of persons
intending to be carried to points within
the state. This position is hardly logical,
to say the least, and if continued and followed out can lead but to absurdities. The
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hotel keeper, at whose house the cab
stopped to take the passenger to the station, would seek exemption from taxation
on the grounds that his house was part of
the system of interstate transportation and
that the tax on his property should discriminate between the value of property
used for purely local travel and that used
for the accommodation of interstate travelers.
The most the plaintiff in error could expect would be to be placed on the same
footing as a short connecting line of railways. In Gladson v. The State of Minn.,
165 U. S. 627, it was held that a railway
created by a state is for all purposes of local
government a domestic corporation, and
its road within the state is a matter of domestic concern. Even when the road
connects, as most all roads do, with railways in other states, the state which
creates the corporation may make all needful regulations of a police character for
government of the company while operating within its limits. The license tax, in
this case, is clearly within the police power
of the city, and it is just and right that the
city should have authority over this means
of transportation.
In many cases the
courts have gone a great deal further towards interference with interstate commerce and upheld regulations that would
seem to be matters of interstate commerce.
Examples of police regulation are recorded
in Cushing et. al. v. The Owners of the
Ship John Fraser, 62 U. S. 184 ; Cooley v.
The Board of Wardens of the Port of Phila.,
12 How. 294, which cases show the power
of regulating harbors. In the matter of
regulating railroads, a law requiring every
engineer who ran a train within the limits
of the state, to pass an examination in certain subjects and take out a license, was
held valid in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S.
465. A law of the state of New York prohibiting the heating of railway cars by
stoves, was held valid even as against a
foreign corporation.
The ordinance In question was passed in
the legitimate exercise of the police powers
of the city of Phila., and further was
passed under the authority of a strictly
constitutional act of the legislature. The
appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.
HAMBLIN, J.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The tax on cabs, omnibuses, etc., may
be justified, as a contribution from their
owners, because they are property; and, as
such, taxable like other property; or, because of their frequent use of the highway,
which is public property, and the duty of
rendering compensation for this frequent
use; or, because of the need of the city's
exercising supervision of them, and the
fitness of exacting a contribution to cover
the cost of this supervision. There maybe
other justificatory reasons.
The cabs of Cummings were not taxed
as property. Had they not been employed
in carrying persons to and from the station, the tax prescribed by the ordinance

would not have reached them. They are
property, it is true, but they are taxed because they are engaged in this business of
carriage.
Had the ordinance taxed them only if
they carried passengers who had come
from other States to the station, or were
going from it into other States, the tax
might be unlawful. It would be unreasonable; and it would discriminate between
intercourse by this means within this
State, and between this State and other
States.
The city of Philadelphia is not bound to
build streets at its own expense without
charge from those who use them, eyen for
interstate transportation-Cfi Afobile v.
Kimball, 102 U. S. 691; Sands v. Maniske
Improvement Co., 123 U. S. 288; nor to
extend its police supervision over those
who use them, without compensation. Nor
is it bound to refrain from police supervision over those using its highways, though
they use them in interstate commerce. It
can tax cars and railroad tracks as property, though instruments of interstate
communication, because it furnishes protection for them; Marye v. B. & 0. R. R.,
127 U. S. 117; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Mass., 125
U. S. 530; Pullman P. C. Co. v. Penna.,
141 U. S. 18. It can regulate grain elevators, though they are used incidentally
to transportation from State to State.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.
The tax of two dollars can beupheld, we
think, as a charge for the use of the highways built by the city at its expense, and
for the supervision needful to guard the
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interests of the public. The streets -re
used, whether the passengers conveyed in
the cabs are, or are not, going beyond or
coming from beyond the State. The cabowner derives a profit from the husiness,
in either case. He has no conceivable
right to earn money by the extraordinary
use of the public property, without making
some remuneration to the public. We
agree with the results reached by the
learned court below. They correspond
with those arrived at by the Court of
Errors of New York, where the same question has been discussed. People v. Knight,
171 N. Y, 354.
Judgment affirmed.
WILLIAM BATES vs. JACOB HOLBROOK.
Trespass-Contributorynegligence-Shooting a tres&passer-Bightsof trespassersto
recover-Liabilityof aproprietor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Holbrook owned a large tract of land on
which was an artificial pond in which he
raised trout. To guard the fish from destruction by animals or taking by poachers,
he kept a watchman, who often fired off a
gun to warn and frighten off any possible
poachers. On a certain night, he heard a
noise in the wood near by, and thinking it
to be a poacher, fired in the direction of
the sound. The ball struck Bates, injuring him severely. This action of trespass
is forthe injury. The watchman's habit of
firing at objects in the grounds, men or
animals, supposed by him to have desigus
upon the fish, was known to Bates.
COOPER and JONES for the plaintiff.
Liability of a proprietor to a trespasser is
that he shall not be grossly negligent, and
that ie shall abstain from the infliction of
Am. &
injuries by active misconduct.
Eng. Encyc., of Law, vol. 21, page 472;
Keegan v. County of Luzerne, 8 Kulp 163.
To establish contributory negligence, reasons for expecting danger must be shown.
Gray v. Scott, 66 Pa. 345. Negligence of
plaintiff did not contribute to injury
shown. Pass. Ry. v. Bowdon, 92 Pa. 175.
BISHOP and DIuMUHELLER for the defendant.
Contributory negligence of any degree
will prevent recovery. Monongahela City
v. Fisher, 1 Amerman 9; R. R. Co. v.
Taylor, 104 Pa. 306; Buitterfield v. Forres-

ter, 11 E:.st 60; Wilson v. Charleston, 8
Allen 137. Post v. R. R. Co., 108 Pa, 585.
Notice to trespasser of dangerous contrivnwes laid for protection of property relieves the owner from liability. Bird v.
1-olbrook, 4 Bing. 628; Hooker v. Miller,
37 Iowa.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action in trespass brought by
William Bates against Jacob Holbrook,
upon the following facts: Holbrook owned
a large tract of land on which there was
an artificial pond in which heraised trout.
To guard the fish from destruction by animals and taking by poachers, he kept a
watchman, who often fired a gun to warn
and frighten offany possible poachers. On
a certain night, he heard a noise in the
wood near by, and, thinking it to be a
poacher, fired in the direction of the sound.
The ball struck Bates, injuring him severely. This action of trespass is for the
injury. The watchman's habit of firing
at objects in the ground, men or animals,
supposed by him to have designs upon the
fish, was known by Bates.
It is an old principle of law that a man
cannot recover damages for injuries which
he has volui'tarily incurred. It has also
been held that a man, placing himself in
a position of known danger and receiving
injury thereby, cannot recover damages
for such injury. Likewise, it has been
held that he who receives an injury from
another may maintain an action for damages, but if the injured party has contributed to the injury by his own negligence,
he cannot maintain an action. It is quite
evident in this case, that if plaintiff had
not been a trespasser, as we assume he
was, the shot would never have been fired
from which the injury resulted. Therefore. we think that negligence on the part
of plaintiff was such as to amount to a
want of ordinary care and was the direct
and proximate cause of the injury. In order to defeat a recovery by the plaintiff, it
is necessary for the defendant to show,
that, but for the negligence of the party injured, operating as an efficient cause of the
injury, the injury would not have occurred, and here, we think, this is shown.
The ract that Bates had notice of thewatch.
man's habit of firing off guns in these
grounds, clarges him with contributory
negligence and, therefore, defeats a recovery in this action. If he would not have
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had notice, he could, undoubtedly, have
recovered. This principle is supported by
Loomis v. Ferry, 28 Wend. 497, and also
in Hooker v. Miller, 37 Ia. 613. It has
also been held in England that a trespasser having notice that "spring guns" are
laid upon certain premises, he cannot recover in an action against the owners for
Slott v.
injuries sustained thereby.
Wilkes, 3 Barn. & Ald. 8041. And that
where a trespasser, without such knowledge, is injured in the same way, he can
recover damages. Bird v. Holbrook, 4
Bing. 628. The cases are numerous in support of the rule, that contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in any
degree, will prevent a recovery. Monongahela City v. Fisher, 111 Pa. 9; Bloomsburg Steam Co. v. Gardner, 126 Pa. 80. In
fuifther support of this doctrine may be
cited Cook v. Johnson, 58 Mich. 437, which
holds that one who voluntarily exposes
himself to evidentrisks caused byanother's
negligence cannot recover against the latter for bodily injuries resulting therefrom,
even for the purpose of saving property or
the lives of animals.
A person traveling on a highway obstructed with snow must use ordinary care
whether to proceed or return. And if
guilty of contributory negligence in proceeding, he cannot recover for an injury
received from defect in the highway, to
which his negligence, in any way, contributed. Horton v. Ipsnich, 12 Cush. 488.
Also a person who voluntarily attempts
to pass over a sidewalk which he knows to
be dangerous, when he might as easily
avoid it, cannot maintain an action against
the town, which is bound to keep the way
in repair, to recover the injuries sustained
thereby. Wilson & Wife v. City of
Charleston, 8 Allen 137; Shaeffler v. City
of Sandusky, 33 Ohio 246.
It seems that a person is not permitted
for purpose of protection, in his absence, of
property against a mere trespasser, to use
anything endangering the life or safety of
humanity. Whether the entry upon his
property be to commit a felony or a breach
of the peace, full notice of the mischief to
be encountered must be given if defendant
wishes to escape liability for damages.
Loomis v. Ferry, supra.
In a certain case defendant owned a vineyard which was invaded by trespassers,

and to avoid fruit being taken, he set a
"spring gun" to protect his property.
Plaintiff, having no knowledge of the gun,
entered the vineyard for the purpose oftaking grapes, and coming in contact with
the gun, received injuries. In this case it
was held that plaintiff could recover because of having no knowledge of tie concealed gun. Hooker v. Miller, supra.
If a man is guilty of contributory negligence in going upon ground in which there
are spring guns by which he is injured,
or, if in crossing a sidewalk which he
knows is icy and which he could escape,
or, if he places himself in any danger by
which he is in the slightest degree negligent, and fails to recover, it isevidentthat
he should not, recover for the injuries received by going upon grounds which are
guarded by a watchman whom he knows
is likely to shoot at him upon hearing his
footsteps, thinking him to have designs
'upon the property guarded. The Court,
believing that Bates, with knowledge of"
the danger to which he would be exposed,
was guilty of contributory negligence by
going upon the land, and, therefore, cannot recover.
Judgment for the defendant.
D. L. CLAYCoMB, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Holbrook had a right to put off those
who trespassed on his land. He could do
this by the application of force to their
bodies, or by the presentation of motives
to their minds. One of these motives was
fear of harm to be inflicted by him or his
agents, and it was immaterial whether
the harm feared was to be inflicted by a
gun or any other implement.
But, it would not follow that, in order
to awaken fear of being shot, Holbrook or
his agent could in fact shoot towards the
trespasser, either with the intention to hit
him, or when, there being no such intention, hitting him was fairly probable.
The shooting in the former case would be
actionably malicious. In the latter case,
it would be actionably negligent. Cf. Bird
v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628; Cooley, Torts,
194.
It need hardly be said that Holbrook
had no right to shoot at Bates, for the
purpose not of frightening him off, but of
punishing him for his trespass. Thus to
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satisfy his anger and vindictiveness, were
IN BE BROWN, ASSIGNEE.
to commit both a tort and a crime.
Holbrook's servant, hearing Bates,
Partnership- Partition- Convey/ance of
"fired in the direction of the sound." He
realty to partnershipas "tenants in commight have done so, without or with inmon" by one of the firm:-Rights of sepatention to hit Bates, and, without inrate creditors to insolvent partner's intention to hit, his act may or may not
terestin partnershiprealty-Act of June
have been negligent.
Whether it was,
4, 1901, P. L. 233.
would be a question for the jury.
Bates knew of the habit of Holbrook's
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
man to fire "at objects on the grounds,
men or animals." If the man had fired
Branon is owner in fee-simple of a manpurposely at him, we cannot think that
ufacturing plant. Smith, Jones and Branhis knowledge of this habit, and the
on decide to form a partnership to carry
negligence of his being on the grounds,
on the woolen business.
Accordingly,
would have excused the man or Holbrook.
Branon, for a valuable consideration, to
But if the shooting was unintended, and
wit, $22,000, conveys to Smith and Jones
a two-thirds interest in the manufacturing
the result of negligence merely, Bates'
plant. The deed sets forth that the said
knowledge of the habit would have preBranon, Smith and Jones are to hold the
cluded him from recovering, because it
would have been negligent in him to have property as "tenants in common, each
having an undivided one-third interest in
exposed himself to the negligent shooting
the same." The business is carried on by
of the servant.
Cf. Ilott v. Wilkes, 3
the partnership for a considerable time,
Barn & Ald. 304; Magar v. Hammond, 171
during which repairs, improvements of
N. Y. 377.
various kinds and many trade fixtures are
The evidence would have justified the
added to the realty, all of which are paid
jury in finding that the shooting towards
for out of the firm's funds. The real estate
Bates was with the intention to hit him,
has always been looked upon and reckoned
or in malicious indifference whether he
was hit or not. Had the jury so found,
as firm assets.
Subsequently, B becomes insolvent, and
we think the carelessness of Bates in exposing himself would have been no bar to works an assignment for benefit of creditors, all of whom are unsecured. The
his action for compensation.
That Bates was a poacher does not ex- assignee, Brown, claims the one-third
undivided interest of Branon in the real
pose him to being shot, in order to deter
estate for the individual creditors, and now
him or in order to punish him.
We think the court in error in with- prays the court for a partition ofsaid land.
These proceedings are contested by the
holding the case from the jury, and instructing it to find a verdict for the de- firm creditors, represented by George W.
White. The deed of the tenants in comfendant. The jury should have been inmon had been entered on record at the
formed that if the shooting was negligent
time of the formation of the partnership.
merely, the contributory negligence of
The contention is that the real estate is
Bates prevented a recovery, but that, if
firm property.
the shooting was purposed, or malicious,
Bates' negligence would not prevent a
Yocum and LA_D
for the petitioner.
recovery.
Assignment by partner of his individual
Judgment reversed.
interest in firm works a dissolution of the
partnership. 13 Pa. 67; 19 Pa. 414.
Record of a deed is notice to all the
world. 59 Pa. 167; 35 Pa. 523; 6 Pickering
85; Bates v. Norcross, 224.
VERA and SmiT contra.
A trust is construed from all the circumstances surrounding the case.
Story's
Equity.
mplied trusts are not within provisions
of Recording Act nor of Statute of Frauds.
2S. & R. 531.
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Assignee's claim is subordinate to firm's
creditors.

6 Mass. 242; 22 Pickering 450.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is a petition on the part of the separate creditors of Branan, praying for partition of the undivided one-third interest
of Branan, of partnership assets to the
preference of firm creditors of the firm of
Smith, Jones & Branan.
A partnership, perfect in every detail,
had been effected; their intention to form
a partnership was clear and manifest; the
agreement was always looked upon by
them as a partnership; the two-thirds interest in the real estate passed for the consideration of $22,000, and the deed was
placed on record at the start of the partnership business.
Branan made an assignment for the
benefit of unsecured creditors who claim
to come in before the firm creditors.
It is a well settled principle of law (too
well founded to require authority), that
ordinarily firm creditors are satisfied out
of firm assets, and separate creditors out of
separate assets.
The contention made by counsel for the
firm creditors that there is a resulting
trust in favor of the partnership, would
have been sound prior to the Act of Assembly of June 4th, 1901, and the firm
creditors would have taken in preference
to the individual creditors.
The Act of June 4th, 1901, provides
"That whenever hereafter a resulting
trust shall arise with respect to real property by reason of payment of purchase
money by one person, and taking of legal
title in the name of another, if person advancing money has power to contract, such
resulting trusts shall be void and of none
effect as to bona fide judgment or other
creditors, as purchase from such holder
without notice, unless, (1) a declaration of
trust in writing has been executed and
acknowledged by holder of legal title and
recorded; (2) or unless person advancing
the money has begun action in ejectment."
P. L. June 4th, 1901, No. 1.33. Therefore,
the contention of the firm creditors, that a
resulting trust exists in favor of the partnership is of no avail. The case of Van
Brunt v. Applegate, 44 N. Y., does not
apply in Pennsylvania.
In Ridgway, Budd & Co.'s Appeal, 15
Pa. 177, Wilson, Green & Mitchell formed

a partnership to manufacture iron. In 1845,
Green sold out his interest to Mitchell.
The following year, Hallowell & Company
brought suit and obtained judgment
against the firm.
In 1847, R. P. Remington obtainedjudgment against the same firm.
In 1845, Green,formerly ofWilson, Green
& Mitchell, entered into partnership with
his two brothers and one Howard, and
purchased land as "tenants in common."
Part of the purchase money was paid and a
mortgage was given for the balance. Howard sold his interest to the Greens, and the
firm became known as the Green Bros.
Nov. 15th, 1847, the firm of Green Bros.
borrowed from Ridgway, Budd & Co., the
sum of $4,000, which they secured by a
mortgage on their .land. The firm of
Green Bros. failed and proceedings were
instituted by Ridgway, Budd & Co. on
their mortgage.
Hallowell & Remington contended that
their judgments were entitled to be paid,
alleging that the interest of Robert Green
(who was a party in their judgment) in
property sold was more than sufficient to
pay them. Ridgway, Budd & Co. claimed
all the money in court for distribution
($2,114). Although judgment for Ridgway, Budd & Co. was entered two weeks
after, they contended they were entitled
to he paid first, because the property was
sold and purchased with partnership funds
of Green Bros., and was therefore applicable to their debts. It was held the
claim of Hallowell was good. The judgment being prior in date to that of Ridgway, Budd & Co., and the property sold,
being separate estate of each partner in
the firm of Green Bros., the judgment
must be first paid out of the proceeds of
the sale. Justice Rogers said: "When
partners intend to bring real estate into a
partnership, their intention must be manifest by deed or writing placed on record,
that purchasers and creditors may not be
deceived. To affect the possession of land,
it is not competent to show by parol that
real estate conveyed to two persons as tenants in commonwas purchased and paid for
by them as partners, and was partnership
property." As in the case at bar, the
property was held as a tenancy in common, and as nothing was put on record
manifesting intention of partners to re-
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gard it otherwise, it must be treated as a
separate estate, and, as such, liable to their
separate creditors. •
Petition of assignee is therefore granted.
LONGBOTTOM, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREM.E COURT.

Brown owning the land prior to the
formation of a partnership, conveyed two
undivided thirds of it, with a view to its
being used by the firm, in carrying on
the woolen business. They all, Brown, and
his grantees, Smith and Jones, "always"
have looked on it and "reckoned" it,
"firm assets." They were equal partners,
and their contributions of this land, were
equal in amount. Considerable repairs
have been made, and improvements and
trade fixtures added, and all have been
"paid for out of firm funds."
Despite the form of the deed, therefore,
which indicates that the grantor and his
grantees, were to hold as tenants in common, the land was partnership land if
their clearly expressed intention may prevail.
It is sufficiently established in this state,
that such a conversion from tenancy in
common to tenancy as partners, may take
place despite the indications of the form
of the deed of conveyance. Abbott's Appeal 50 Pa. 234; Shafer's Appeal, 106 Pa.
49; Hayes v. Treat, 178 Pa. 310; Warriner
v. Mitchell, 128 Pa. 153; Colner v. Greig,
137 Pa. 606.
The intention may be manifested by
the use of the firm's money in purchasing
it. But there are other ways. In this
case the land was bought by Smith and
Jones, with a view to use by the firm.
It was improved by means of firm funds.
It was regarded as firm property.
Although, as respects purchasers of undivided interests from individual partners,
or lien creditors of such partners, Ridgway,
Budd & Co's Appeal; Gunnison v. Loan
Co., 157 Pa. 302; the partnership character
of the land could not be established by
parol, Warriner v. Mitchell, 128 Pa. 153.
(See cases therein cited,) it can be so
established, as regards the partners themselves; Shafer's Appeal, 106 Pa. 49. So, it
can, as regards general creditors of the
partners and of the firm, so that the latter
will be payable from the proceeds in preference to, and to the exclusion of, the former;
Abbott's Appeal, 50 Pa. 234.

Brown has made an assignment for the
benefit of creditors. Whether this occurred prior to or later than the enactment
of the act of June 4th, 1901, P. L. 404, Relating to Insolvency, does not appear. We
shall assume that it was made before.
No principle was better established under
firm law pertaining to Assignments for
the Benefit of Creditors, than that the
assignee had no larger rights with respect
to the assigner's property than he had
himself, and that he conferred therefore,
on the assignee these rights only. Assignments, p. 127. Brown having agreed
with his partners to treat the land as firm
assets, could not, by his own act, without
the co-operation of the other partners,
reconvert it into individual property.
Neither can his assignee. His unsecured
creditors claim through the assignee.
They must be postponed, so far as the land
in question is concerned, until the partnership affairs are settled, and partnership
creditors paid; and the surviving partners
have the right to sell the land, if necessary,
for debts.
We have not been able to discover the
slightest relevancy to the point before us,
in the provisions of the act of June 4th,
1901, with regard to resulting trusts; cited
by the learned court below. We regret that
the interesting and important question
involved in this case, has not been able to
secure for itself from the court below a
reasonably thorough investigation.
Decree reversed, with direction to dismiss the petition.
ANNA WILSON vs. REBECCA WILSON.
Insurance-Amicable action to determine
rights of beneficiaries-Insuredchanges
name of beneficiary.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Wilson, son of Anna, and husband
of Rebecca, became a member of a Mutual
Aid Society which entitled the beneficiary
named by him to receive at his death a
sum equal to $1.00 for each member of the
society at that time. He could change
the beneficiary by notifying the company,
and receiving a new certificate naming
the new beneficiary, for which a fee of 50
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cents was to be paid. The first certificate
taken out named Rebecca as beneficiary.
She deserted him about two weeks before
his death, when, being ill and having
gone to his father's to be nursed, he wrote
to the secretary of the society, requesting
a new certificate, and enclosing 50 cents.
The letter was dropped in the post office,
but for some reason it was not delivered to
the society's secretary, or other officer, for
four (4) days. Meantime, Wilson died.
This is an amicable action to determine
who has a right to the money.
Mowny and ILANARD for plaintiff.

The society is bound to pay to the beneficiary named. 155 Pa. 505.
The surrender of the certificate gave the
last named beneficiary the right of recovery. 122 Pa. 428; 92 Pa. 50; 154 Pa.
484.
Compliance with the rules of association
will give right of recovery in equity. 123
N. Y. 367; 9 L. R. A. 534; 9 L. R. A. 84.
FLEITZ and CORE for defendant.
To establish a change in a contract, it
must appear that both parties to the contract acquiesce. Emerson v. Graff, 29 Pa.
358; Shupe v. Galbraith, 32 Pa. 10; Warren Boro. v. Daum, 73 Pa. 433.
The proposition for a change never having been acted upon by the company, no
change was ever made. More v. Pierson,
6 Iowa 279; 1 Parson's Contracts, 6th ed.,
482.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an amicable action by Anna Wilson against Rebecca Wilson to determine
who is entitled to the funds derived from
a beneficial certificate.
It appears that John Wilson became a
member of the Mutual Aid Society, and
took out a certificate naming therein as
his beneficiary his wife, Rebecca. She
having deserted him while he was ill, and
he having gone to his father's to be nursed,
decided to change the beneficiary. By
the rules of the society, he could change the
beneficiary by notifying the Company and
receiving a new certificate. "The rightof
a member in good standing to change the
beneficiary named in his certificate by the
substitution of another of the class entitled
is absolute." This right was given by the
society and he was at perfect liberty to exercise it.
Neither the assets of the beneficiary nor
the surrender of the certificate was necessary; this rule is recognized by the society
as fundamental and it has been fully sus-

tained by the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Pa. Hamilton v. Arcanum, 189
Pa. 275; Fisk v. Equitable Aid Union, 20
W. N. C. 290; Beatty'sAppeal, 122 Pa. 428;
Same case 154 Pa. 484.
The insured having the right to change
the beneficiary, the fact that the letter of
the assured did not reach the society i 1
after the death of Wilson does not prevent
the change to take effect as directed. He
did all that was required by the society,
preliminary to getting a new certificate,
changing the beneficiary.
In Luhrs v. Luhrs, 123 N. Y. 367, which
is almost an identical case with the one in
hand, it was held, that Luhrs had done all
that was required of him in order to
change the beneficiary, and all that remained to be done was purely formal, in
the doing of which The Supreme Lodge
had no discretion; that the death of Luhrs
did not operate to prevent the consummation of the surrender, and that the subsequent issuing of the new certificate as directed, should relate back to the time of
the surrender.
Whether or not the new certificate was
issued does not appear, but we have both
the wife of Wilson and also his mother
claiming the money. We, therefore, presume that it had been issued, for the matter, as we have shown, was not discretionary with the society, and they were bound
to make the change as requested.
The delivery of the notice is the essential ground on which this case rests.
Under the ruling of the case of Hamilton
v. Arcanum, 189 Pa. 273, we think the
mailing of the notice was sufficient; it was
the acceptance of an offer made by the society. In the case cited, supra, the assured held the notice himself, hadit lying
on his desk and never took any steps to
forward it to the head department. Had
he posted the same or taken any steps to
forward it, it would have had the effect of
a delivery. On that ground we base our
argument and hold the posting of the letter was sufficient to effect a delivery and
notice to the society.
Equity, it is held in 123 N. Y. 367, will
decree that as done which ought to be
done, and act as though the certificate had
been issued.
For the reasons given above we hold, and
decree that the plaintiff, Anna Wilson, the
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mother of John Wilson, whom the assured
intended as his beneficiary, shall be paid
the amount of $1.00 for each member of
the society at the time of his death.
YEAGLEY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

John Wilson named Rebecca, his wife,
as the beneficiary to whom, at his death,
the death benefits were to be paid. Her
desertion changed his intention, and he
wrote to the secretary of the society requesting a new certificate, and enclosing
50 cents. The letter, though dropped in
the post office in time to have been delivered to the secretary before Wilson's
death, was not delivered to him for four
days. Meantime Wilson had died. The
by-laws of the society allowed a member
to change the beneficiary by notifying the
company and receiving a new certificate,
for which a fee of 50 cents was 'o be paid.
The post office was the agent of Wilson.
The company was not notified till the
letter was actually received. Wilson was
then dead. The 50 cents were not paid to
the company until the same time. Wilson
was then dead. The change of beneficiary
must be made during the life of the member. Hamilton v. Arcanum, 189 Pa. 273.
The acts entitling the substitute, must
have been done before his death. The originally named beneficiary's right becomes
vested at his death. We are unable to
agree, therefore, with the able judgment
of the learned court below. Fink v. Fink,
171 N. Y. 616.
Judgment reversed, and judgment for
defendant.

THORPE vs. SMILES.
Insurance-Attachment of moneyl in the
hands of insurancecompany by creditors
of beneficiary.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On a judgment for $3,000 against Sarah
Smiles, Thorpe attached money due her
from the life insurance company. A policy
for $2,000 was taken out by her husband,
payable to his wife, Sarah, for her sole use,
and free from her own debts, ten years
from its date, or from the earlier death of
her husband. The period having expired,

the attachment was levied before the payment of the money. The company is
willing to pay it to Thorpe if he is entitled, otherwise to Sarah Smiles.
MowRY

and

CLAYCOMB

for plaintiff.

The transaction was a gift from the husband to the wife. The title being in Sarah
Smiles, the money was subject to attachment by her creditors. There is nothing
to indicate the intention to create a trust.
185 Pa. 41; 70 N Y. 212:80 N. Y. 422.
CORE and DErANEY for defendant.
The words of the policy created a trust
for the sole and separate use of Sarah
Smiles, and the money was exempt from
attachment by her creditors. McCojanell
v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. 476; Wrightv. Brown,
44 Pa. 224; Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 Rawle
231.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Thorpe held ajudgment of $3,000against
Sarah Smiles. In order to secure part
payment of it he attached a life insurance
policy of $2,000, which Smiles had taken
out, payable to his wife, ten years from its
date or on the earlier death of the husband.
The following words were in the policy,
"for her sole use and free from her own
debts." The company says they are willing to pay the money to the person entitled
to it. Thorpe claims that it is an absolute
gift and not a trust and that it can be attached.
A gift is the voluntary transfer of property by its owner to another without consideration therefor, or without consideration other than love and affection, but requires a renunciation by the donor and the
acquisition by the donee of all interest in
the title to thesubjectof the gift, and divesting the donor of all control and vesting title
in the donee. Jackson v. Ry. Co., 88 N. Y.
521.
We believe that there was not such an
acquisition by the donee or the wife, of all
interest in the policy, as it was made payable ten years after date or on the earlier
death of the husband. During this time
she only had the equitable title.
By late Pennsylvania decisions the words
"for her sole use and free from her own
debts" "creates a sole and separate use
trust, and there seems to be nothing in the
statutory provisions to indicate that the
legislature intended to abrogate the rula
and dispense with the estate, which under
our equity practice, has been so long recognized as a proper protection for a married
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woman, not only against the power and
persuasion of her husband, but against his
or her own improvidence."
A man may make such a settlement of
this policy upon his wife if he chooses, and
"there is nothing in theAct of 1887 which
would deny the right of the husband to
set up a trust for the maintenance and
protection of his wife, and the property
embraced in the settlement is only the
property of the wife under the terms of the
-settlement." McConnell v. Lindsay, 131
Pa. 436. When it was plainly stated in
this policy that Mrs. Smiles could not use
it for the payment of her own debts, we
cannot see how it can be attached for the
same purpose. By the case just cited, it
cannot be taken for that purpose. In the
sami case, Mr. Justice Clark said: "A
married woman cannot convey nor mortgage property left in trust if the instrument creating the trust gives her iio
authority to do so. If she is denied the
right to mortgage it, or give it in satisfaction of her own debts, it does not seem
reasonable to suppose that it can be attached."
We do not know when the debt was
contracted, but have presumed it was before the taking out-of the policy.
A few of the dases cited by plaintiff's
counsel apply mostly to absolute gifts, as
where the donee had the separate custody
of the gift.
In view of the cases cited by the defendant's counsel, which, we think, governs
this case, we think an attachment will not
issue.
WRIGHT, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

In the absence of a sole and separate
use, or of a spendthrift trust, or its similar,
the money could be attached by the
creditors of Sarah Smiles, while in the
hands of the Insurance Company.
A gift by will i can be so conditioned,
that it may not be intercepted, until it
reaches the donee. Thus, in Beck's-Estate,
133 Pa. 51, the legacy was absolute, but on
what was termed the "condition" that it
should not be liable to be attached or seized
for the legatee's debts. Although no trust
was created, it was held that the fund
was protected "in its transit from the
executor to the legatee."
Goe's Estate,
146 Pa. 431; Barker's Estate, 159 Pa. 518.

The present fund is in a sense a gift by
the husband to his wife. He has purchased
it from the Insurance Company with his
own money. He has declared that it is
to be paid to her "free from her own
debts." This must mean that it is not to
be diverted before payment to her, for the
payment of any of her debts, and the attachment, if successful, will divert it. It
is not necessary to find that there is a
spendthrift trust, in order to reach this
result. The company has contracted with
the husband of Mrs. Smiles, to pay money
directly to her, and we see no reason for
denying its duty and its power t6 do so,
despite the intervention of creditors.
Had Mrs. Smiles made the contract, it
is likely that it would not have prevented
her creditors from attaching the money.
Ghormley v. Smith, 139 Pa. 584.
If the direction had been that, after paymnent of the money to Mrs. Smiles, neither
it, nor that in which it was invested,
should be subject to debts, it would probably have been void. The attempt would
have been to make the same person cestui
que trust and trustee, as in Ehrisman v.
Sener, 162 Pa. 577; Hahn v. Hutchinson,
159 Pa. 133 Of, also, Wanner v. Snyder,
177 Pa. 208.
The learned court below has concluded
that the transaction may be deemed to
give rise to a sole and separate use. The
husband huys from the Insurance Company a sum of money, to be paid to her
"for her sole use and free from her own
debts." One of the properties of a separate
use is that the subject of it is not, in
Pennsylvania, capable of direct or indirect
alienation.
The use of the expression
"sole use" and the provision against indirect alienation, may plausibly be taken
to point to a sole and separate use. The
language however is that the money is to
be paid to Sarah Smiles free from her
debts. It was money. It is not said that
it must be re-invested by Mrs. Smiles. If
she spent it, there could be no means of
reclaiming it.
There is not, we think,
enough to indicate that the money was to
be held in specie during the coverture of
Mrs. Smiles, nor is there an express prohibition of taking it in execution, if it could
he found.
Judgment affirmed.

THE FORUM
WM. GROSS vs. LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY.
ofpolicqLife Insurance-Interpretation
No exception as to suicide-Suicide of
the assured-.Refusal of company topay.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
S. Gross was insured in a Life Company
in favor of Win. Gross, a son, which contained no exception on account of suicide.
Three years and four months after obtaining the policy, he was charged with
embezzlement and in his humiliation and
fear, he killed himself.
His son, Win. Gross, demanded the
money but the company refused to pay.
At the time of his death, S. Gross's expectancy of life was 25 years. The policy
was for $10,000.
FLEITZ and WILCOX for plaintiff.
When policy of Life Insurance contains
no stipulation as to suicide, the policy will
not, if assured commits suicide, be avoided.
Pattison v. Life Ins. Co., 43 L. R. A. 253;
Womis v. Assurance Co., 183 Pa. 563; Seller
v. Life Co., 43 L. R. A. 537; Darrow v.
Family Fund, 6 L. R. A. 495.
A policy of Life Insurance, containing
no stipulation as to suicide, and made for
the benefit of a third person cannot be
avoided if theassured commits suicide. 1.51
Pa. 17; 144 Mass. 374; 3 L. R. A. 217; 128
U. S. 195.
HILLYER and ALBERTSON fordefendant.
The policy would be against public policy. Ritter v. Ins. Co., 17 C. C. A. 537;
Hartman v. Ins. Co., 21 Pa. 466.
Wilful self-destruction is a fraud upon
the company. Hartman v. Keystone Ins.
Co., %IPa. 479. Suicide while sane avoids
the policy. Gibbon v. Gibbon, 175 Pa. 475.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The insurance was in behalf of the son
of S. Gross. That a son has an insurable
interest in the life of his father, is recognized as law, in Pennsylvania. Reserve
Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Kane, 81 Pa. 154; 1
Biddle, Ins. p. 188.
Had the policy stipulated that it was not
to be paid, if the assured should die by his
own hand, the stipulation would have been
valid. He not being insane, his self-killing would have avoided the policy; or
rather, would have furnished the very
state of thing in which nothing would become due upon it.
The policy did not contain such stipulation, and the question is whether it must,

nevertheless, be read as if it did. There
are cases which have held that when A
procures an insurance on his life, payable
to himself or his executor or administrator,
his self-murder will constitute an exception
to the operation of the policy. The company will be understood to agree to pay
only upon the occurrence of death otherwise than by sane self-killing. Ritter v.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 140.
On the other hand, if the insurance
money is payable to some other than the
assured, to wife, or son, or daughter, the
self-killing of the assured will not avoid
the policy. The issue of such a policy
gives to the beneficiary an interest which
cannot be defeated by the subject of the
insurance. Gibbons v. Gibbons, 175 Pa.
475; Matlack v. Life Ins. Co., 180 Pa. 360.
While he cannot be compelled to continue
to pay the premiums, the company cannot
decline to receive them from the beneficiary, should the assured himself fail to
tender them. It would be harsh to allow
an act of the assured, that of self-murder,
to defeat the right of the wife, son,
daughter, creditor, or other beneficiary to
receive the money upon his death in the
absence of an express limitation of the
company's liability, in the policy. Morris
v. Life Ass. Co., 183 Pa. 563; Fitch v. Life
Ins. Co., 159 N. Y. 557; Darron v. Family
Fund Society, 116 N. Y. 537. There is a
specially vigorous and original discussion
of the question by CollinsJ., in Campbell v.
Supreme Conclave Heptasophs, 66 N.J. L.
274, where the same conclusion is reached.
The company runs the risk, in the
absence of stipulation of death from negligence, or recklessness, of death by the
felony of another, of death by the hand of
the assured himself, if he is insane. We
see no good reason for holding that it does
not. assume the risk, as respects other
beneficiaries than the assured himself, of
Human
the self-killing of the assured.
nature being what it is, the cases will
always be rare, in which sane men will
kill themselves for any purpose.
It is to be noted that it does not appear
that the policy was taken out with a view
to making it payable by self-murder. Nor
does it appear that when S. Gross killed
himself he did so, in order to mature the
policy and secure the payment of it for his
son. The policy was probably not in his
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thought at all, and if he had thought of it,
ahd even believed that his killing himself
would avoid it, it is not at all unlikely
that he would have done exactly what he
did. There was no fraud at the inception
of the contract; there was no intention in
the self-murder to defraud.
Judgment for plaintiff.
WILLIAM SHAY vs. JOSEPH
GALLAGHER.
Building contract-Substantialperformance-feasure of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Gallagher engaged Shay to erect a house
on his land, it was to be of three stories,
brick, and the stories were to be of a specified height, the roof was to be of slate.
During Gallagher's absence in Europe, the
work was done, but the stories were less in
height by six inches than they should
have been, and the roof was of shingles.
The stories, however, were higher than
houses of the class ordinarily are. On
Gallagher's return, he expressed his satisfaction with the house, while to Shay he
declared his indignation that the house
was not finished according to contract,
and declared that he would not pay a cent
for it. He did not offer Shay to remove
it, on restoring the ground to its former
condition, and on paying damages, but
took possession and occupied it. This is a
suit for the purchase money.
JONES, C. D., and COOK for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff should recover for substantial performance subject to deductions
for imperfections. Danville Bridge Co. v.
Pomory, 16 Pa. 151; Gallagher v. Sharpless, 134 Pa. 134; Tilton v. Miller, 66 Pa.
388- Tuesdall v. Watts, 12 Pa. 73; Preston
v. Pinney, 2 W. & S. 54; Hall v. Rupley,
10 Pa. 231. Declarations of Gallagher
against interest amissible, Shafer v. Lacock, Hawthorne & Co., 168 Pa. 497.
WiLcox and DEVER for the defendant.
The plaintiff must show strict compliance with the contract, and evident fraud
and negligence bars recovery. Preston v.
Finney, 2 W. & S. 53; Pepper v. City of
Philadelphia, 114 Pa. 96; Erie City Iron
Works v. Baker & Co., 102 Pa. 156.
Under the facts, the plaintiff should recoverall or nothing. Wilkinson v. Becker,
155 Pa. 194. Defective work purposely
done is malafides and prevents recovery.
Waclo v. Haycock, 25 Pa. 382; Chambers
v. Jaynes, 4 Pa. 39.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

Relative to the performance of a contract
obligation, three distinct cases are conceivable, namely, full performance of all
the duties imposed by the terms of the
contract, substantial performance of such
duties, and absolute failure to perform.
In the present case, it is clear that there
was not a full compliance with the terms
of the contract as to the height of the
stories and the kind of roof. From this
we must necessarily conclude that Shay
cannot recover the entire contract price,
although it may be found that there has
been a substantial performance. For
while it is true that the common law rule
of strict compliance with the terms of the
contract as a condition precedent to the
right to recover anything on the contract
has been superseded in Pennsylvania by
the equitable doctrine of substantial performance, yet it has never been held that
part or substantial performance gives a
right to full compensation. Moore v.
Carter, 146 Pa. 502.
Where the party seeking to recover on
a contract has acted with a bonafide intent to fulfill his whole contract, and the
other contracting party has received the
fruit of the labor so performed, there is a
substantial performance. Whether it was
necessary for Gallagher to accept the house
in order to clothe Shay's act with the
character of substantial performance, it is
not necessary to decide. The fact is that
the house was accepted by Gallagher, and
according to a long line of cases in this
state, there was a substantial performance
under the facts in this case. Preston v.
Finney, 2 W. & S. 53; Gallagher v. Sharpless, 134 Pa. 134; Sticker v. Overpeck, 127
Pa. 446. See also Danville Bridge Co. v.
Pomroy & Colony, 15 Pa. 151; cited approved in Pepper v. Philadelphia, 114 Pa.
111.
The remaining question is as to the
amount of compensation recoverable by
the plaintiff, and tlie defendant's measure
of danmages. The solution of one makes
unnecessary the solution of the other.
The rule as ordinarily stated in cases of
building contracts is, that the defendant
will have the right to deduct from the
contract price such damages as he has
suffered by the breach, and, that the
measure of damages is what it would cost
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to put the building in the condition contracted for. See cases, supra. But if this
rule is to be applied in the present case it
will, no doubt, produce the anomalous result of a substantial performance of a contract, and an apparent great benefit conferred, with no actual compensation recoverable. The house as constructed lacks
18 inches of the height contracted for.
Looking at the case from the standpoint
of the architect, it will be seen that the
cost of putting the present structure in
the form mentioned in the terms of the
contract would equal, or probably exceed,
the cost of erecting an entirely new structure. The re-adjustment of the windows
in the walls, and of the floors, and other
parts of the house, so as to meet the exact
requirements of the contract, would leave
for the plaintiff very little, if anything,
after- the application of the above rule of
damages.
To avoid making the applicability of a
rule of law depend solely upon the result
of its application-to avoid the appearance
of making the hardship in the particular
case the sole ground of the rejection of the
rule-and to clear the way for tne application of a different rule, it will be necessary to compare the present case with
those cases in which the above rule has
been applied, and to examine closely the
rule, to see whether it is to be applied with
the strictness contained in the above statement of it.
The only distinction between this case
and the cases in which the rule has heretofore been applied lies in the fact, that,
in the former cases, the actual remodeling
of the building to conform with the terms
of the contract did not involve such an
extensive demolition of the whole building
as would be involved in a remodeling in
this case. In the former cases, the merits
of the cases were satisfied by a technical
application of the rule. This would not
be true in the present case; and we are of
the opinion that the rule should be relaxed
in this case, and that the defendant should
be allowed to deduct only such damages
as arise from an omission or imperfection
which "virtually affects the usefulness of
the house." Danville Bridge Co. v. Pomroy & Colony, and Pepper v. Philadelphia,
supra.
If the remodeling of the building in-

volves the destruction of those parts of the
building that were constructed in accordance with the terms of the contract, and
the proper construction of which, together
with defendant's acceptance, constituted
the substantial performance, the defendant does not have the right to deduct the
entire cost of such remodeling from the
contract price. He must be content with
damages for such deviations as "virtually
affect the usefulness of the house."
If it is objected that under this rule the
amount of compensation will depend upon
the speculation of the jury; it may be
answered that the method of ascertaining
the amount of damages is the same under
both rules, so far as speculation, is concerned.
H. C. Fox, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The general principle is, that when A
undertakes for a compensation to produce
a certain effect for B, B is under no duty
to pay for it unless that effect is produced.
A substitution of a different effect is not
permitted to A.
But some effects are complex; e. g. the
erection of a house on a prescribed plan
and specifications; the building of a bridge;
the excavating of an oil well; the introduction of plumbing. Parts of the effect
may be made bonafide with effort to comply with the contract, and may in fact
comply with it.
Other parts may not
comply, though with effort; or they may
not comply and there may have been no
effort to comply. The departures from
the contract may differ in degree, some
being slight and comparatively unimportant, others serious.
In some cases, when the deviation was
comparatively unimportant; i. e., when
there was a "substantial' performance;
when the defect of performance was only
in "some comparatively slight particulars," Peffer v. Philadelphia, 114 Pa. 96;
Preston v. Finney, 2 W. &. S. 53; or "in
minor points," Moore v. Carter, 146 Pa. 492;
Sticker v. Overpeck, 127 Pa. 446; or in
"comparatively unimportant items,?' Gallagher'v. Sharpless, 134 Pa. 134, the defect
was held not to disentitle the performing
party to the contract price, less a proper
abatement.
In a majority of cases of defective per-
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formance, in which the performing party
has been held entitled to recover, there has
been an appropriation and use of the
product by the opposite party; e. g. of a
bridge, Danville Bridge Co. v. Pomroy, 15
Pa. 159; of the drilling of an oil well,
Holmes v. Oil Co., 138 P. 546; of a house,
Crawford v. McKinney, 165 Pa. 605.
There are several cases in which the
departure from the contract must have
been conscious and purposed, and yet, because of its supposed comparative immateriality, it has not been allowed to defeat the performer's claim to compensation.
There are on the other hand cases which
hold that, when the deviation from the
contract is deliberate, purposed, it matters
not whether the product is utilizable by
the opposite party, for the same objects,
or not. Thus, in Gillespie Tool Co. v.
Wilson, 123 Pa. 19, the contract was to
drill an oil well 8 inches in diameter, to
a depth of from 940 to 1280 feet, and then
5J inches in diameter. The well adtually
drilled was for 180 to 200 feet, at the bottom,
by 41 inches in diameter. No recovery of
compensation was allowed,Sterrett, J., saying. "It is incumbent on him who invokes
its protection (i. e. of the equitable doctrine
of substantial performance) to present a
case in which there has been no wilful
omission or departure from the terms of
his contract. If he fails to do so, the
question of substantial performance should
not be submitted to the jury." Cf. Wilkinson v. Beeker, 155 Pa. 194.
The stories of the house built by Shay,
were to be of certain height. They were
in height less, by six inches. The roof
was to be of slate. It was in fact of
shingles. These departures could not well
be otherwise than deliberate. But the
same could be said of the defects in several

other cases in which, nevertheless, the
doctrine of substantial performance was
applied. We shall not, in this opinion,
compare these cases, but content ourselves
with this general statement.
The house built by Shay, while not like
that contracted for in the height of its
stories, or in the material of its roof, was
like it, in all other regards. It was a
habitable dwelling, and was in fact occupied and continues to be occupied by
Gallagher.
We think that when the
actual product is usable, as of the class to
which the product contracted for belonged;
when, e. g. the contract calling for a house,
the actual product is a house, and usable
as such, and it is taken by the opposite
party and used, the fact that it is in some
regards different from the product specified in the contract, and that this difference
was conscious and proposed, will not preclude a recovery of the purchase money,
Jess equitable deductions. Cf. Crawford v.
M Kihney, 165 Pa. 609; Holmes v. Oil Co.,
138 Pa. 546.
As the court below points out, one rule
for the measurement of these reductions is
the cost of making such changes or additions as will cause the house or other
product to correspond with the stipulations of the contract, Sticker v. Overpeck, 127 Pa. 446.
But this is not the only measure. Another would be the difference between the
value of the actual structure, and that of
the ideal structure specified in the contract. To elevate the stories, and to tear
off the shingle roof and put on a slate roof,
would involve an expenditure in excess of
this difference. In such a case, we think
this difference the appropriate measure.
Cf. Ellis v. Lane, 85 Pa. 265; Gallagher v.
Sharpless, 134 Pa. 134.

